MNCs from different countries of origin are widely held to have distinct preferences regarding the presence of employee representative structures and the form that employee 'voice' over management decisions takes. Such preferences are said to derive from the national models which prevail in the different countries of origin in which MNCs are based. Findings from a large-scale survey of the UK operations of MNCs indicate that country-of-origin influences on patterns of employee representation and emphasis on direct or indirect channels of employee 'voice' are attenuated by other factors, notably sector and method of growth. They also reveal significant recent innovation in representation and voice arrangements by this key group of employers. More recent work recognises the diversity that voice arrangements take, including non-union as well as union representation and direct as well as indirect (representative-based) forms of employee participation (Bryson, 2004; Freeman et al., 2007) . Accordingly, We understand employee voice as incorporating representative voice and various forms of participation developed directly between management and workers. (Freeman et al., 2007: 3).
committees (which can be union and/or non-union based) or non-union structures such as company councils. Direct channels of consultative voice are constituted by two-way mechanisms of employee communication and involvement, such as team briefing, quality circles and 'town hall' meetings between managers and the workforce (Bryson, 2004; Freeman et al., 2007; Millward et al., 2000) .
Recent studies have mapped significant change on both dimensions across the advanced Anglophone economies. Purcell and Georgiadis (2007) identify two common trends: a widespread decline in union membership and representation; and a marked growth in employers' use of direct forms of employee involvement. In Britain, findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) reveal that alongside a further decline in union representation since the 1998 WERS has come a 'growing heterogeneity of representational forms within British workplaces ' (Charlwood and Terry, 2007: 335) . This includes non-union structures and hybrid arrangements combining union and non-union representation. WERS2004 also found a shift in the mix of channels through which consultative voice is exercised, with a decline in the proportion of workplaces covered by a joint consultative committee and an increase in the already high proportion of workplaces utilising one or more two-way forms of direct, employee involvement (Kersley et al, 2005) . The decline in indirect forms of consultation is all the more striking given the prospective implementation of the UK's Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) legislation, which came into effect in April 2005.
These marked changes draw attention to the role of employer preferences in shaping arrangements for employee voice, to which the literature has given 'insufficient attention' (Bryson et al., 2006: 280) . Employers have 'decided preferences' on the presence and form of voice regime, continue Bryson et al. (2006) , and scope to act on these in a country such as Britain with (until recently) little legal prescription. Even under the ICE legislation, the initiative as to whether to respond and the choice over the form of any consultative arrangement established lies largely with the employer (Hall et al., 2007) i .
From a theoretical perspective, these shifts in voice practice can be located in inherent features of different types of voice arrangement which act to shape employer preferences (Bryson, 2004) .
Union representation involves an independent party in voice arrangements, and therefore requires management to cede a measure of its decision-making prerogative. Against this, by acting as the agent of collective voice, unions can reduce the costs to the employer incurred by the exit of otherwise dissatisfied workers and, by involving employees, improve the quality of work-related decisions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) . Non-union forms of representation are conceptualised as a form of 'union substitution', which can secure the benefits of collective voice whilst not having to cede authority to an independent party (Purcell and Georgiadis, 2007) .
According to Bryson (2004) , HRM theorists (e.g. Storey, 1992) contend that direct voice will be more effective voice in reducing exit and improving work-related decisions since representative arrangements create a barrier between managers and employees, and fail to reflect heterogeneity in worker interests. In practice these different forms of employee voice co-exist -direct voice mechanisms are found in the majority of unionised British workplaces, whilst indirect consultative mechanisms are more widespread where unions are present (Bryson, 2004) -- suggesting that employers may secure complementarities from a dual or multi track approach.
Multinationals and employee voice
Bringing multinational employers into the picture adds a further dimension to consideration of employer choice. A core issue in debates over their impact on employment practice in host environments has been the extent to which MNCs seek to innovate, through inwards diffusion of home country practices, or to adapt to prevailing practice locally. Because of their embeddedness in national institutions, including frameworks of labour law, employee representation and indirect channels of consultative voice have been regarded as matters more constrained to local adaptation than direct channels of employee involvement, seen as more open to innovation (Ferner, 1997) . In the context of contemporary Britain, however, the growing heterogeneity of representative arrangements, minority coverage of both union representation and indirect consultative arrangements and permissive framing of the ICE legislation, suggest that these more institutionally embedded features might also now be open to innovation by MNCs.
Concerning the nature of such innovation, preferences are seen to be shaped by the institutions governing the practice of employee representation and consultative voice in MNCs' domestic environments : institutions which form part of an inter-locking set which variously define the specific characteristics of different 'national business systems' (Whitley, 1999) . Almond et al (2005: 277) stress, however, that these preferences 'may [have to] be modified to fit the institutional context of various host countries'. In addition, preferences may differ amongst MNCs from a given country of origin, reflecting the important of distinctive variants within national business systems, and associated different approaches to employee representation and consultative voice, giving rise to 'intra-model' variation (Almond and Ferner, 2006 ).
In addition, there is a potential asymmetry between MNCs headquartered in countries such as the US, with a tradition of anti-unionism, and those based in the countries of continental western Europe, which provide institutional and legal support to collective employee representation and consultation, in choice of voice practice in an institutionally permissive host environment such as the UK. Whereas the former may well be inclined to replicate domestic US practice, the latter may see an opportunity to escape constraints which domestic environments are perceived to impose (Meardi et al., 2009 ) and experiment with different, Anglo-American practice (Ferner and Varul, 2000) .
Existing research on the voice practice of MNCs has largely focused on the foreign operations of multinationals headquartered in a handful of countries: the US above all, Japan, Germany and the UK. Less is known about the approaches of MNCs based in other parts of Europe: indeed survey-based studies have tended to treat Europe as a homogeneous block (XXXX, 2007) .
Investigation has also tended to focus on employee representation, less so on consultative voice.
In particular, 'although there is increased recognition that multiple [voice] channels may be the norm' (Wood and Fenton-O'Creevy, 2005: 29) , and the relationship between direct and indirect forms of consultative voice has been addressed in several recent studies (Brewster et al., 2007; Bryson, 2004; Millward et al., 2000) , the relative balance between the two forms has not been examined through the prism of the practice of MNCs based in different countries. Wood and Fenton-O'Creevy (2005) examine the balance amongst MNCs based in a single country across a range of host environments.
US-based MNCs have 'long been associated with hostility to unions in their foreign operations' (Ferner et al, 2005: 703) , reflecting the anti-unionism of major variants -union avoidance 'low road' and union substitution 'HRM' -of the American business model (Almond and Ferner, 2006) . Under the American system there is little scope for non-union forms of representation (LeRoy, 2006) , which has translated into 'a marked preference for non-collective employee representation' (Colling et al., 2006: 96) including direct forms of employee involvement.
Empirically, the imprint of the American model on the practice of US-owned MNCs is confirmed by the comparatively high incidence of non-unionism amongst their operations in Britain reported in a number of previous surveys (reviewed ). Yet, amongst the operations of US-based MNCs in Britain, Colling et al. (2006) detect a measure of pragmatism: union recognition being accepted in many of the manufacturing operations they studied. They draw attention to 'intra-model' variation according to sectoral norms and age of subsidiary. Such variation is consistent with the idea of heterogeneity amongst firms rooted in different variants of the American business system (Almond and Ferner, 2006; Katz and Darbishire, 2000) .
Japanese-owned MNCs are generally held to have a preference for a (single) enterprise union or (non-union) company council, reflecting the company union model that prevails in Japan.
Consistent too with long-established practices of direct employee involvement in Japanese production, the use of mechanisms such as team briefings and quality circles is expected to be prominent in the foreign operations of Japanese MNCs (Guest and Hoque, 1996; Wilkinson et al., 1993) . Wilkinson et al's survey of operations of Japanese-owned manufacturing MNCs in Wales found union recognition at almost all, which took the form of a single union agreement in the great majority. Almost all had also established non-union based consultative forums. Other studies of Japanese MNCs in Britain confirm that they pursue a dual track approach to consultative voice, being more likely than either US-based MNCs or local firms to have representative-based forms of voice and to make use of team briefings and quality circles (Guest and Hoque, 1996; Wood, 1996) . In contrast, and pointing to intra-model variation, the Japaneseowned manufacturing plants in Elger and Smith's (2005) in-depth study were predominantly non-union and use of direct forms of employee involvement limited.
The German model is characterised by dual channel employee representation, with unions representing workers in multi-employer collective bargaining and works councils, with extensive powers of consultation and codetermination, representing worker interests within the firm. The diversified quality production which became the hallmark of the German industrial model (Streeck, 1992) , rested on extensive employee involvement; more recently expressed in the combination of direct consultation practices with the established tradition of indirect consultation (Tüselmann et al., 2005) . In a major survey of the UK operations of German-based MNCs, compared against a reference group of American-owned counterparts, Tüselmann et al (2005) identify the translation of this modified German model into the British context: union recognition is combined with widespread take-up of direct consultation practices. German-based MNCs are more likely to recognise trade unions than their US-based counterparts but display an equivalent incidence of direct consultative practices. Ferner and Varul (2000) draw attention to the existence of intra-model variation, in the form of non-unionism amongst some UK operations of German-owned MNCs, locating it in the devolution of responsibility for IR policy to subsidiary managers and associated scope for experimentation with currently dominant, Anglo-American business.
Sweden's single channel system is characterised by high levels of union representation, which ensure the basis for trade union-based consultative voice within firms. Delegated forms of work organisation, resting on group-based forms of employee participation, constitute a further distinctive feature. The continued salience of these features is confirmed by recent survey evidence (Brewster et al., 2007; Gill and Krieger, 2000) . Data on the voice practices of Swedish multinationals overseas is limited, although a study of employee involvement practices in three smaller-sized MNCs found that direct forms of voice tended to be transferred to the UK operations but not indirect forms (Andersen, 2006) . The opportunity to escape perceived constraints on voice arrangements at home and/or to experiment with Anglo-American practice may also be attractive to some Swedish MNCs.
In France, legislative support is given to a plurality of representative forms within firms, both union-and workforce-based. Consultative structures are mandatory in firms employing at least 50 (Tchobanian, 1995) . In practice, union representation is a minority phenomenon amongst firms, reflecting low levels of union membership, although other forms of employee representation are widespread. Consultative structures are found in four out of every five firms.
Direct forms of employee consultative voice, however, are less widespread than in many other European countries (Gill and Krieger, 2000; Tchobanian, 1995) . There is little available evidence on voice practices in the overseas operations of French-owned MNCs, although French multinationals have been prominent in extending the practice of social dialogue through consultative structures to European-and global-levels (Contrepois et al., 2007) . A study of the central eastern European operations of prominent French MNCs reports, however, that representation and indirect consultation tend only to be found where companies have acquired brownfield sites with pre-existing arrangements (Contrepois et al., 2007 ).
Britain's single-channel system of employee representation has rested on voluntary recognition of trade unions by employers. Recent trends and developments in employee representation and consultative voice are outlined above. In the early 1990s, UK-based MNCs were found to be somewhat more likely to recognise trade unions in their UK operations than their overseasowned counterparts, with the reverse being the case for direct forms of employee voice (Marginson et al, 1993) . There was no difference in the incidence of indirect consultative voice.
Investigating representation and voice arrangements in the European operations (including A counterfactual in the case of either proposition is that intra-model variation may dampen country-of-origin influences. The foregoing review suggests that factors such as sector, age of subsidiary and company strategy are also likely to influence patterns of employee representation and the relative emphasis between direct and indirect channels of consultation. Consideration of intra-model variation leads to two further propositions: 
Data
The data come from a large-scale, 2006 survey of employment practice in the operations of 302
MNCs in the UK involving a structured interview with a senior HR executive. The achieved sample exceeds that of most surveys of employment practice amongst multinationals (XXXX, 2007) , and allows comparison of MNCs from different countries of origin, including intraEuropean variation, within the same host environment. MNCs with at least 500 employees worldwide were covered: for overseas-owned companies, the survey required them to also have at least 100 employees in their UK operation; for UK-owned multinationals the equivalent was an operation employing at least 100 in another country.
The survey was based on a listing of the population compiled by the authors, the most comprehensive available, and involved two stages. XXXX (2007) The fieldwork at both stages was undertaken by a professional survey agency, contracted by the researchers, i.e. the authors, in a manner similar to that employed in realising Britain's WERS series (see Kersley et al., 2005: 328-34) . Access was secured and interviews arranged by the agency, using a letter from the researchers outlining the aims of the study and requesting cooperation together with the CIPD endorsement. The face-to-face interviews were conducted by some twenty of the agency's professionally-trained interviewers. In addition to their training, consistency of approach across interviews -and interviewers -was ensured by the use of CAPI technology, the preparation of detailed guidelines on administering the survey instrument, interviewer briefings -involving the researchers -prior to fieldwork, and consistency checks on the resulting dataset. CAPI streamlines the administration of the complex, structured questionnaire, cross-checks responses for consistency during the course of interviews and records and stores data instantly. Throughout the process there was liaison between the researchers and the agency. Consistent with recent studies of employee voice (Bryson, 2004; Willman et al., 2006) , the presence of direct consultative voice was taken as being indicated by the use of at least one of Sector. Differences can be expected across the three broad industrial sectors identified:
manufacturing, other production and services. In particular, union organisation is longer established and more widespread in manufacturing than services (Dølvik, 2001 ), a distinction which also amongst US-owned MNCs reflects the enduring influence of different variants of the American business model . In turn, manufacturing MNCs are also likely to place greater emphasis on indirect forms of consultative voice, than their service sector counterparts.
Employment Size. The survey asked about the number employed in the UK operations.
Representative structures, either union or non-union based, might be more common in larger than smaller sized UK operations (Marginson et al., 1993) ; larger UK operations might also be more likely to emphasise indirect forms of consultative voice.
Vintage. If the political and economic context now prevailing in the UK is less constraining than hitherto, MNCs which have established operations in the UK more recently may enjoy more scope to establish non-union based representative arrangements than longer established firms.
Longer established firms might engage in 'double breasting' (Beaumont and Harris, 1992 ) -entailing a mix of union and non-union arrangements at, respectively, older and newer sites.
Method of growth.
MNCs growing by acquisition are more likely to have mixed patterns of employee representation, involving union and non-union based structures inherited at different sites, than those which have grown organically (either by opening new sites or expanding existing ones).
Diversification.
A mixed pattern of employee representation might also be more common in
MNCs whose UK operations comprise unrelated businesses, as compared to those operating in a single business.
The precise specification of these potential sources of intra-model variation, and the country-oforigin variables, is given in Appendix Table A1 , which also reports the mean values relevant to the subsequent regression analysis.
Findings
The section commences with descriptive information on the measures of employee representation and consultative voice, and recent changes in the patterns observed. In so doing, the dependent variables for the subsequent logistic regression analysis, which tests the propositions developed above, are specified.
a) patterns of employee representation
Unions are represented for the purposes of collective representation of the LOG at one or more sites in 47% of MNCs. The total includes 16% where recognition is across all sites, 23% at some or most sites and 8% at a MNC's single UK site. Hybrid (union at some sites, non-union at others) 11
Neither union nor non-union 29
Base 
b) indirect and direct consultative voice
The incidence of the four direct forms of consultative voice specified above is shown in the top panel of Table 2 . Briefing groups are used almost universally (96% of cases), whilst the other three forms are each found in three-quarters of companies. One or more of these two-way forms were found in all but four companies (1%). 
Any representative consultation arrangement 82
Base: All companies (N=302)
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows almost three-quarters of MNCs (73%) The UK's ICE legislation does not automatically require firms to take steps to comply (Hall et al., 2007) . Instead it requires companies to respond to a request from employees to establish arrangements, should one be forthcoming, or enables management to initiate the process, should it so wish. Unlike the more general picture of relative inactivity across UK companies falling within the legislation's scope (Hall et al., 2007; Kersley et al., 2005) , the legislation would seem to have prompted substantial recent change in MNCs' arrangements for employee consultation.
Forty-two per cent of companies with consultative arrangements reported that they had made changes over the previous 3 years: in nine out of every ten cases, such change involved the establishment of new arrangements at all (three-quarters of the relevant total) or some (onequarter) sites; in seven out of ten it (also) involved modification of existing arrangements. Of the 54 MNCs introducing non-union representative arrangements over the previous 3 years (see above), over three-quarters also report establishing new consultative arrangements. This picture suggests that MNCs are at the forefront of legislatively induced innovation.
Respondents in 243 MNCs (81%) reported both indirect and direct forms of consultative voice; arrangements but did not use any of the direct mechanisms; and one company used neither. The 243 companies using both were asked about the respective emphasis management placed on the indirect and direct channels. Their responses, which form the third dependent variable for the regression analysis below, are reported in Table 3 . Although, consistent with wider developments (Purcell and Georgiadis, 2007) , an emphasis on direct channels dominates one on indirect channels, of note also -and supporting earlier argument -is that a 'dual track' policy of equivalent emphasis on both kinds of channel is as widespread.
c) employee representation: regression analysis
The regression analysis proceeds in two steps. First, country-of-origin influences on the two-way contrast between MNCs reporting any representative arrangement (union and/or non-union) and those reporting none are investigated in a binary logistic regression. Second, influences on the four alternatives in Table 1 are explored. Since there is no clear ordering amongst the four alternatives, the appropriate estimation technique for the second step is multinomial regression.
In both steps 'neither union nor non-union' representation is taken as the reference category.
The estimates resulting from the 'any representation' regressions are reported in Table 4 , first, including the country-of-origin variable only and, second, the variables which are potential sources of intra-model variation also.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
The first set of estimates is significant at the 1% level overall. The Beta coefficients indicate some significant country-of-origin influences on the presence of any representative arrangement as compared with the US-owned reference group. The odds ratios give the relative magnitude of these effects. For example, the odds of French-and German-owned MNCs having arrangements for employee representation are, respectively, more than three and almost seven times that of their American counterparts. MNCs based in the Nordic countries, the UK, the rest of Europe, Japan and the rest of the world are, however, not significantly more likely to have representative arrangements than US-based MNCs.
The second set of estimates is also significant at the 1% level overall. Moreover, the step chisquare indicates that the inclusion of the other factors significantly adds to overall explanatory power. The Nagelkerke R 2 rises from 0.08 to 0.27. French-and German-owned multinationals continue to be significantly more likely than US-owned companies to have representative arrangements, and so now do those based in the UK. The coefficients on the other country-oforigin variables continue to be insignificant. A strong sector contrast is evident, with both service and other sector multinationals being significantly less likely than those in manufacturing to have representative arrangements. The odds ratios indicate the magnitude of these sector effects as approximately one-sixth in the case of services compared to manufacturing, and around onequarter for other production. None of the other structural variables exercises a significant influence on 'any representation'.
Results of estimates from the multinomial regression of the four alternative forms of representation arrangement, first, including the country-of-origin variable only and, second, the other variables also are reported in Table 5 .
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
The first set of estimates only achieves significance at the 10% level overall. The Beta coefficients indicate that some countries/regions of origin are significantly associated with particular patterns of employee representation, as compared with the reference category of USowned MNCs. The odds ratios indicate that the odds of French and German-owned MNCs having union only representative structures are, respectively, more than three times and almost ten times greater than US-owned companies. French-owned companies are also significantly more likely than US-based multinationals to have non-union only representative structures. The other significant country-of-origin influence concerns UK-owned MNCs, which are significantly more likely than US-based companies to have hybrid representative arrangements.
Representative structures in MNCs based in the Nordic countries, the rest of Europe, Japan and the rest of the world are, however, not significantly different from those found in US-based MNCs.
Turning to the second panel of Table 5, which Overall, support for proposition A is mixed: whilst some country-of-origin influences operate in the way anticipated, others do not. Two of the three sub-propositions framed with more confidence find support, but so too do two of the three which were more tentatively framed.
Specifically: 1) relating to US-owned MNCs is supported in comparison with multinationals based in Germany, France and the UK; 2) concerning Japanese-owned MNCs, is however not supported; 3) relating to German-owned companies, although tentatively framed, is supported; likewise 5) relating to French-owned companies; whereas on 4) the findings on Nordic-based MNCs do not provide support. German-and French-owned MNCs appear more likely, in the UK, to reflect practice in their domestic systems than do multinationals based in the Nordic countries. Sub-proposition 6) concerning UK-owned MNCs is supported, and the magnitude of the relevant coefficient in Table 4 is smaller than those for French-and German-, but not Nordicowned MNCs. The superiority of the regressions including the demographic and corporate strategy variables -in terms of model chi-squared statistics, step chi-squared statistics, Nagelkerke R 2 and the significant influence exercised by sector and method of growth on patterns of employee representation -indicates stronger support for proposition C, which takes account of intra-model variation. Importantly, the relevant country-of-origin effects retain their significance with the inclusion of the other variables; the demographic and corporate strategy factors complement, and do not displace, the effects of country-of-origin.
The presence of intra-model variation was investigated further for the US-based multinationals within the sample. A logistic regression for any representation against sector, size, age of subsidiary and aspects of company strategy, reported in Appendix Table 2 , is significant at the 1% level. The Nagelkerke R 2 is 0.42. A striking sectoral difference is again apparent: American service sector multinationals are significantly less likely than their manufacturing counterparts to have any form of representative arrangement. Other factors, however, do not appear to be a significant source of intra-model variation. A multinomial logistic regression for form of representation, not reported here, yielded similar findings: union, non-union and hybrid patterns of representation are each significantly more likely amongst American multinationals in manufacturing than those in services.
d) consultative voice policy: regression analysis
The alternatives for management policy towards consultative voice (Table 3 ) are ordered; hence the estimation technique adopted was ordinal logistic regression, taking 'emphasis on indirect channels' as the reference category ix . Results of estimates including, first, country-of-origin only and, second, also the other factors are reported in Table 6 . A positive sign on a coefficient
indicates that an emphasis on indirect consultation is more likely than equivalent emphasis on both, which in turn is more likely than an emphasis on direct consultation. A negative sign indicates the opposite.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
The estimates including country-of-origin only (first and second columns) only achieve significance at the 10% level overall. Japanese-based MNCs are significantly more likely than their US counterparts to emphasise indirect forms of consultation, as are those based in the rest of Europe. The odds, for example, of Japanese-owned companies emphasising the indirect consultation channel over an equivalent emphasis on both, or placing equivalent emphasis on both over emphasising the direct channel, are some four times greater than for US-owned multinationals. As anticipated, UK-owned do not differ significantly from US-owned MNCs.
The French, German and Nordic-ownership variables do not, however, exercise a significant influence.
The inclusion of the other factors (columns 3 and 4) results in a more robust set of estimates: the chi-squared is significant at the 1% level overall and so too is the step chi-squared statistic for the inclusion of the other factors. The Nagelkerke R 2 is 0.19, as compared to 0.06 previously.
The significance of the country-of-origin variables is unchanged. There are significant sector differences, with multinationals in services and other production showing a marked tendency to emphasise direct over indirect channels as compared with those in manufacturing. Contrary to expectations, MNCs which have established operations in the UK over the past 5 years are significantly less likely to emphasise the direct channel than longer established companies.
Given that these companies were also noticeably more likely to report being involved in a merger or acquisition over the previous 5 years than longer established MNCs x , it is tempting to infer that current policy might reflect a legacy effect from previous ownership. Yet MNCs which have grown by acquisition show a marked, and significant, tendency to emphasise direct over indirect channels. On diversification, companies diversified into related businesses are significantly less likely to emphasise direct channels than those focused on a single business, although those diversified into unrelated businesses do not differ significantly from the latter.
UK employment size does not have a significant influence.
Overall, support for proposition B is qualified: the specific sub-propositions framed with more confidence find support, whereas those framed more tentatively do not. Accordingly, 1) relating to US-owned MNCs is confirmed in comparison with MNCs based in Japan and the UK; 2)
concerning Japanese-owned MNCs is supported; and 6) receives support, as UK-owned are no less likely to emphasise direct channels than US-owned companies. Sub-propositions 3)
concerning German-owned MNCs; 4) relating to Swedish-owned MNCs; and 5) concerning
French-owned MNCs are not supported, suggesting that MNCs from these countries do not, in the UK, feel constrained to place the emphasis on the indirect channel that is associated with their domestic systems. The superiority of the regression including the other factors -in terms of model chi-squared statistic, step chi-squared statistic, Nagelkerke R 2 and the influence exercised by four of the five demographic and company strategy variables -lends support to proposition D, which takes account of intra-model variation. The relevant country-of-origin effects retain their significance with the inclusion of the other variables, supporting the idea that the latter do not displace, but complement, the former.
Again, the presence of intra-model variation was investigated further for US-based multinationals. A logistic regression against sector, size, age of subsidiary and aspects of company strategy, reported in Appendix Table 3 , is significant at the 5% level. The Nagelkerke R 2 is 0.22. A sharp sector difference was evident: US MNCs in services are significantly more likely than their manufacturing counterparts to emphasise direct forms of employee involvement. Other factors did not appear as a significant source of intra-model variation.
Discussion and Conclusion
This investigation of the influence of MNCs' country-of-origin on their employee voice practices in a permissive host environment reveals an uneven picture. Influence is more apparent on employee representation than on management policy towards consultative voice channels, and varies in significance across companies headquartered in major industrialised countries. The influence of demographic factors and corporate strategy structure, in particular sector and method of corporate growth, indicates the presence of intra-model variation amongst MNCs based in any given country. Such intra-model variation complements, and does not seemingly override, home country influences, consistent with Katz and Darbishire's (2000) 'converging divergencies' thesis.
Findings from several previous studies on MNC voice practices are confirmed, whilst some others are confounded. The former include the well-established preference of US-based MNCs for non-unionism, and direct forms of employee consultation (Colling et al, 2006; Ferner et al, 2005) . Tüselmann et al's (2005) conclusion that German-based MNCs tend to recognise trade unions in the UK context is supported, but less so their contention that German companies are embracing a new model in which as similar weight is given to direct forms of employee consultation as indirect ones. Contrary to some studies (Guest and Hoque, 1996; Wilkinson et al, 1993 ), but consistent with Elger and Smith (2005) , Japanese-owned multinationals are no more likely than their US counterparts to have employee representative structures, although they tend to emphasise the indirect consultative voice channel where such structures are present. UK-owned MNCs are distinctive in the incidence of hybrid arrangements, consistent with a trajectory away from union-based arrangements (Wood and Fenton-O'Creevy, 2005) . Anglo-American business practice (Ferner and Varul, 2000) and/or to escape constraints on employee voice practice which domestic environments are perceived to impose (Meardi et al., 2009 ).
The attention drawn to the presence and, by implication, salience of intra-model variation in some recent studies (e.g. Colling et al, 2006; Ferner and Varul, 2000) is underscored by the findings. A limitation is that the influence of heterogeneity within national business systems, stemming from different management styles -such as the contrast between 'New Deal', union avoidance and union substitution models amongst US-based firms (Almond and Ferner, 2006 (Rees and Edwards, 2009 ). The wider implication for the influential 'national business system' literature (e.g. Whitley, 1999) is that attention needs to be paid to the varieties within national models associated with sector differences and with those in management style and strategy.
The extent of recent changes in voice arrangements and the findings on management policy towards different voice channels speak to the relevance of examining employer preferences Purcell and Georgiadis, 2007) . Moreover, management policy in these multinationals is as likely to emphasise a dual track approach, giving equal emphasis to either, as it is to emphasise the direct channel. Employer preferences are not necessarily absolute, preferring one channel or another; combining different channels can offer complementary voice benefits to employers. As a result, significant numbers of multinational employers in a major Anglophone economy still embrace representative-based forms of employee voice. The reference categories are in italics.
Levels of significance are denoted by starts: * = 10% level, ** = 5% level, *** = 1% level. The reference categories are in italics.
Levels of significance are denoted by starts: * = 10% level, ** = 5% level, *** = 1% level. The two sets of regressions relate to differing bases, to which the columns refer:
-column A: pattern of employee representation (base: all companies) -column B: relative emphasis on direct or indirect channels of consultative voice (base: companies reporting both channels) N in each column is reduced because of missing values for some variables. The reference categories are in italics.
Levels of significance are denoted by starts: * = 10% level, ** = 5% level, *** = 1% level.
i The ICE legislation expressly permits compliance via direct as well as indirect consultative voice channels.
ii This is on the assumption that non-respondents would have screened out of the population on the basis of the size criteria at the same rate as respondents.
iii Senior HR managers were defined as those with a job title of HR/Personnel Director, Senior Manager, Manager or Senior Officer or titles deemed as equivalent by the respondent. iv Average duration of interviews was 70 minutes. v Representativeness checks of the screener sample against the original database listing of eligible companies have also been undertaken (XXXX, 2007) . vi There is no measure of meetings of senior managers with the whole workforce which allow for employee input in the survey, which Bryson (2004) and Willman et al (2006) include in their operational definition. The present survey asked about meetings of senior managers with the whole workforce, but without specifying that they should allow for employee input. However, all cases which reported these also reported team briefings. vii The location of the operational headquarters of an MNC may differ from a 'flag of convenience' location registered for taxation purposes (XXXX, 2007 
